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Abstract
The teacher-student relationship is modeled as an agency problem, where teach-
ers are concerned with human capital formation and students with ability signaling.
We distinguish between two cases depending on whether in ability inference the job
market can or cannot observe the grading rule applied. We show that many empir-
ical grading patterns, including grade compression and inflation, are all consistent
with optimal ability screening when grading rules are unobservable. With observ-
able grading rules, the teacher perfectly screens students’ abilities provided certain
conditions hold. We apply the model to discuss policy applications such as “No
Child Left Behind.”
∗Manuscript submitted January 2012; revised January 2013, August 2013.
1This work is a revised version of the first chapter of my thesis written at the Stockholm School of
Economics. I would like to thank the editor and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments
and suggestions. I also thank Tore Ellingsen, Christian Ewerhart, Drew Fudenberg, Magnus Johannes-
son, Karl Wa¨rneryd, and seminar participants at various institutions. Financial support from the Jan
Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation and Forschungskredit of the University of Zurich is gratefully
acknowledged. Please address correspondence to: Robertas Zubrickas, University of Zurich, Depart-
1 Introduction
In the economics literature, there is a dichotomy of views on the role of education. The
traditional view of human capital formation (Becker 1993) is challenged by the idea that
education serves the purpose of ability signaling (Spence 1973; Riley 1979; Bedard 2001).
In this paper, we take the standpoint that teachers are concerned with human capital,
whereas students with ability signaling. In particular, students treat knowledge acquired
as abstract, ephemeral, and, therefore, costly compared to the opportunities foregone.
Ability signals come in the form of grades, about which, in contrast to students, teachers
are impartial per se. The differing attitudes toward education create a conflict of interests
between teachers and students. This paper is an attempt to model the resulting agency
problem that, as we argue, can have a distinctive feature. With asymmetry in information
about the grading rules applied, grades can become costless incentives. We show that the
theoretical predictions of our model with costless grades closely match many empirical
grading patterns.
The teacher-student relationship is modeled as a monopolist screening problem akin
to Mussa and Rosen (1978). A teacher teaches a class of students with disparate abilities
for the subject taught. A student’s ability is his private information, and the higher the
ability, the lower the learning effort he needs to exert to attain a certain knowledge level.
The assumption is that the teacher has a technology – the exam test – that allows her
to assess accurately the knowledge levels attained by her students. The teacher sets up
a grading rule that assigns grades to exam scores, i.e., to knowledge levels. We solve for
the optimal grading rule that maximizes the expected knowledge level of a grade-minded
ment of Economics, Scho¨nberggasse 1, CH–8001 Zurich, Switzerland. Phone: +41 44 634 35 88, email:
robertas.zubrickas@econ.uzh.ch.
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student, where the utility value of a grade comes from its ability-signaling properties.
In determining the optimal grading rule, we distinguish between two cases depending
on whether the expected distribution of grades has an effect on their ability-signaling
values or not. The distribution matters when the job market observes the grading rule
applied and, thus, can make a correct inference about a student’s expected ability. In this
case, we show that the optimal grading rule perfectly screens abilities provided certain
conditions hold. But in the other case, related to the situation when the job market does
not observe the grading rule applied and makes inference using a commonly perceived
grading standard, perfect screening is no longer expected knowledge maximizing. With
unobservable grading rules, the signaling values of grades are fixed, which, consequently,
renders grades as costless incentives. We show that with costless grades the teacher rather
distorts the effort incentives of more able students than those of less able ones, yielding
coarse grading.
The predictions of the model with costless grades closely match many empirical grad-
ing patterns. First, the phenomenon of grade compression can be explained by the equi-
librium pooling that arises in our model. Second, in the dynamic version of the model
with many teachers and the job market adaptively adjusting its perception of grading
standards, we obtain the gradual deterioration of grading rules resulting in grade inflation.
Third, the dynamic model also explains the reduction in time spent for study by full-time
students, reported by Babcock and Marks (2011), in concurrence with increasing average
grades. Fourth, the model provides a rationale for the discretization of grading scales as
we obtain that in the long run no type is screened in equilibrium. Finally, we present
a comparative statics result that the more pessimistic a teacher is about her students’
abilities, the more lenient she is in grading. This theoretical prediction finds a strong
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empirical support from the literature on educational and psychological measurement that
shows that professors apply more stringent grading criteria in fields with more able stu-
dents, and vice versa (see Goldman and Widawski 1976; Strenta and Elliott 1987;
Johnson 2003). The latter evidence suggests that grading behavior is affected by class
composition, supporting our approach of ability screening.
The approach of this paper toward the teacher-student relationship and the suggested
explanation of the aforementioned empirical grading patterns are novel in the economics
literature. Unlike in this paper, many existing explanations tend to rely on arguments
that go beyond the classroom. For instance, McKenzie and Tullock (1981, Ch. 17) see
the expanding availability of education as a cause of grade inflation. They argue that
due to increasing competition universities engage in lowering grading standards in order
to attract more students, thus, creating conditions for grade inflation. The proponents
of this explanation may possibly overlook other channels for grade inflation that can
originate from the expanding availability of education. For instance, with more students
enrolled the distribution of abilities can become more skewed toward the lower end of
the ability space. According to our comparative statics result, teachers respond to this
change by applying more lenient grading rules in order to extract more effort from more
numerous low-ability students, thus, producing grade inflation. Without accounting for
changes in the composition of students, empirical studies can overestimate the effects
of competition among universities on grade inflation. The other related literature is
discussed in the next subsection.
Generally, the agency model studied here relates to a broader class of three-tier agency
problems with hidden information, where the interim tier’s objective is the alleviation of
informational asymmetries between the top and bottom tiers (see Lizzeri 1999). When
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the preferences of the interim and top tiers are misaligned with respect to the actions
of the bottom tier, the agency relationship between the interim and bottom tiers can
feature asymmetric transfer values. This asymmetry in transfer values can have important
implications for the form of incentive schemes at the bottom tier. Besides the example of
the teacher-student relationship, another example is job performance appraisal. As later
discussed in the text, the compression of appraisal ratings frequently observed in practice
(see Murphy and Cleveland 1995) can arise for the reasons similar to those behind grade
compression as postulated here, namely, the costlessness of rewards. A line manager
may find it rewarding to inflate appraisal ratings when he is not held accountable for the
resultant payroll cost.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a literature review, we
present a modeling framework in Section 2. The case of unobservable grading rules is
analyzed in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 3, we solve for the optimal grading rule in the
static model and in Section 4 we analyze the dynamics of grading rules under adaptive
expectations. Section 5 deals with the case of observable grading rules. In Section 6,
we relate our main findings to the grading patterns observed in practice and discuss
policy applications. The last section concludes the study. All omitted proofs are in the
appendix.
Related literature
An agency approach toward the teacher-student relationship is also taken in Dubey and
Geanakoplos (2010). They deal with the question of discretization of grades: what
grading scale, finer or coarser, a teacher should use in order to elicit maximal learning
effort from students. The teacher-student relationship is modeled as a game of status
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with stochastic output like in a tournament. In their model, a student’s utility of a grade
depends on the class ranking, status, resulting from the grade obtained. They find that
teachers should use coarse grading schemes and “pyramid” the allocation of grades: the
highest grade would be available to fewer students than the second-highest grade, and
so on. While their model provides a rationale for the discretization of grades, it is not
consistent, however, with the compression of highest grades and grade inflation. Thus,
besides status incentives, there may be other first-order motivators in the teacher-student
relationship.
In the strand of literature on the economic theory of educational standards, an agency
approach is applied toward designing high school graduation requirements (see Becker and
Rosen 1992; Costrell 1994, 1997; Betts 1998). In crude terms, a policy maker searches
for the passing test score that maximizes a specified social welfare function (typically,
human capital) taking into account the optimal response by learning-averse students.
Like in our model with observable grading rules, analysis is centered on the trade-offs of
incentive and sorting effects that a change in educational standards (e.g., a higher passing
score or an additional educational credential) can have on students’ learning behavior. In
this literature, however, the teacher-student relationship is not explicitly modeled, where
the assumption is of invariant grading rules applied by teachers. Significantly, a reform of
graduation requirements can have an effect on the form of a teacher’s objective function
and, accordingly, on the grading rules applied, which, in turn, may affect the achievement
of the projected goals of the reform. We illustrate this argument when discussing policy
applications later in the text.
Recently, the problems of grade compression and grade inflation have been approached
from the perspective of the informative content of grades that university administration
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chooses to disclose. The information disclosure policy is modeled as a mapping from
students’ abilities into ability signals under the assumption that students’ abilities are
observed by administration (unlike in our model). With the objective of maximizing
students’ average job placement, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) show that administration
compresses ability signals sent to the job market if the mapping from student ability to job
desirability is concave. In the model, they require disclosure policies be consistent so that
a signal is equal to the expected ability of students entitled to the signal (as also imposed
in our model with observable grading rules). While giving an explanation for compressed
grades, their model, however, does not explain the emergence of inflated grades as pointed
out by Chan, et al. (2007). In the latter work, the consistency requirement is relaxed
so that schools can send inflated messages (as in our model with unobservable grading
rules). They show how competition among schools for better student placements can
further worsen the problem of compressed grades, ultimately resulting in inflated grades.
Yet, their model does not explain grade inflation as a dynamic process, i.e., the gradual
increase of grades over time, which our model does produce. Relatedly and similarly to our
argument but in the context of information disclosure, Yang and Yip (2003) argue that
grade inflation can arise from a free-rider problem between universities as the signaling
value of a transcript is based on “collective reputation.” However, this literature also
assumes the invariance of grading rules and, thus, cannot address the empirically observed
mismatch between students’ abilities and grades: At the same university, professors of
more able classes tend to apply more stringent grading rules notwithstanding identical
disclosure policies.
On the theoretical side, our basic model with unobservable grading rules is a ver-
sion of the monopolist screening model of Mussa and Rosen (1978), modified with free
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but bounded transfers from the principal to the agent. As we demonstrate, with free
transfers it is never optimal to screen most efficient types. Gains from screening do not
outweigh losses stemming from suppressed incentives for less able students imposed to
ensure incentive compatibility. In the framework of monopolist screening, the scenario
that, unlike the agent, the principal is indifferent to transfers is also studied in Guesnerie
and Laffont (1984). They distinguish between the “type A” and “type B” preferences of
the principal, where the difference is that a transfer enters only the latter (conventional)
preferences. The “type A” preferences are primarily used to analyze the social planner’s
problem of social welfare maximization. A transfer is equivalent, figuratively speaking,
to distributing money between two pockets of the same jacket, leaving the social welfare
intact. Therefore, the framework of Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) does not apply to the
problem studied here. In our model, the principal is actually of “type B” as she cares
only about her own utility but does not bear the cost of motivating the agent.
The property of free incentive transfers arises in the model of self-enforcing relational
contracts of Levin (2003). In a repeated relationship, compensation paid in a given period
does not affect incentives in later play and, as a result, risk-neutral parties can transfer
wealth between them at will. The dynamic enforcement constraint, however, puts a limit
on wealth transfers, which depends on the total discounted value of the relationship. With
a low discount factor and, thus, a low limit on transfers, the principal finds it optimal to
pool the most efficient types for reasons similar to those in our model: At the margin, the
benefit from screening is zero, but the shadow cost is positive. When the discount factor
is sufficiently high, which allows for almost unbounded wealth transfers, it is optimal for
the principal to elicit the socially desirable (first-best) effort levels from every agent type.
In other words, in effort elicitation the principal is either constrained by wealth transfers
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or by the first-best effort levels. In our model, however, the optimal effort levels from the
principal’s perspective do not coincide with the social optimum, taken to be the sum of
the teacher’s and students’ utilities, and are bounded only by available rewards (akin to
the wealth constraints in Levin (2003)). It implies that in our model the constraint on
transfers (grades) is always binding irrespective of its size.
In the literature quoted above as well as in the current paper, the central question is
that of pooling and separation of agent types. The same question arises in various contexts
with non-monetary transfers and which policy dominates depends on relative advantages.
In wage setting, Fang and Moscarini (2005) show that with workers overconfident in their
own skills no wage differentiation is a profit-maximizing policy due to a relatively larger
impact of negative morale effects that stem from differentiation. In credit rating agency,
Mathis, et al. (2009) show that when reputational concerns are not too strong credit
rating agencies find it profitable to apply lax appraisal standards and inflate credit ratings.
For the problem of conspicuous consumption Rayo (2013) characterizes necessary and
sufficient conditions when a monopolist producer chooses to screen perfectly consumer
types. The latter work closely resembles our model with observable grading rules and
will be referred to later in the text.
2 Framework
There is a teacher teaching a class of students a particular subject. Students select the
subject for exogenous reasons, e.g., it is compulsory in their curriculum.2 The teacher’s
2Arcidiacono (2004) empirically argues that students select their majors out of intrinsic preference.
At the same time, Sabot and Wakeman-Linn (1991) show that students’ choice of classes not required
for their majors is responsive to their grade expectations. Here, we do not model this possibility.
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goal is to pass on knowledge to the students. She has a technology, the exam test, that
allows her from a test score x ∈ [0, X] to assess the knowledge level attained by a student.
(The upper bound X is large enough to allow for an interior solution.) We assume that
the teacher’s technology is perfect in the sense that there is a deterministic and direct
relationship between test scores and knowledge levels. Students differ in their privately
known learning abilities θ, distributed in the population according to a distribution F (.)
over an ability space [θL, θH ], 0 < θL < θH . Achieving a test score x comes to a student
of ability θ at an effort cost of C(x)/θ, where C(.) ≥ 0 is an increasing, strictly convex,
and twice differentiable function with C(0) = 0 and C ′(0) = 0.3
The teacher uses grades r ∈ [0, 1] as incentives to motivate her students to perform
on the exam. The upper bound of 1 is assumed to be institutionally preset and so is
the grading framework: The assessment of student performance is done in the form of
grades only.4 The teacher-student relationship develops as follows. First, the teacher
sets up a grading rule, which is a set of direct score-grade allocations, {x(θ), r(θ)}, θ ∈
[θL, θH ]. Then, each student reports a type θ̂ ∈ [θL, θH ] or, equivalently, chooses an
allocation (x(θ̂), r(θ̂)). The teacher’s objective is to maximize her expected utility defined
as
∫
V (x(θ))dF (θ), where V ′(.) > 0. A student maximizes his utility of grade r less the
3The hidden information assumption can be replaced by a constraint that grades can only be con-
ditioned on a student’s exam score but not on his ability even if observed by the teacher (e.g., from
previous academic records). For classes of large size, the two approaches are equivalent.
4In the model, it is ultimately ability signals that the teacher rewards her students with and the form
of appraisal or a grading framework is immaterial as long as it spans the ability space. However, this
observation holds only if the teacher cannot type-discriminate her students by, e.g., sending confidential
recommendation letters. In this paper, we do not consider the latter possibility, which, though, seems to
be relevant for small size graduate classes. To model this situation, the message space of grades would
need to be augmented with types, the route left for future research.
9
effort cost of C(x)/θ spent to obtain it.
We define the utility of a grade by the ability level signaled by the grade to the job
market. We start with the case when the utility of a grade is fixed, i.e., independent
of the grading rule applied or of the distribution of grades in the class. In particular, a
student’s utility of a grade r is given by ϕ(r), where ϕ : [0, 1] → [θL, θH ] is a publicly
observable grading standard. In the paper, this case is related to the situation when
the job market does not observe particular grading rules and relies on the commonly
perceived grading standard ϕ(.) for the purpose of ability inference.5 We also analyze
the case of unobservable grading rules in the dynamic setting with adaptive expectations.
Then, we consider the case when the job market observes the grading rule applied and
can make a correct inference about a student’s expected ability. Under this circumstance,
the utility of a grade is dependent on the grading rule and is set to be equal to the mean
of types receiving the grade.
Here, we impose some further structure on the model. The distribution function F (.) is
twice differentiable with its probability density function f(.) > 0. In addition, we assume
that the hazard rate, f(θ)/(1 − F (θ)), is non-decreasing in θ. Until further notice, we
let the teacher’s utility function be linear in test scores, V (x) = x. The teacher’s linear
utility can be interpreted that she equally cares about low- and high-ability students’
5This situation can arise when there are too many academic institutions for the job market
to distinguish among: The number of degree-granting institutions in the US gradually increased
from 563 in 1869–1870 to 4352 in 2007–2008, see Table 188 of 2009 Digest of Education Statistics,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09 188.asp. Another justification for the assumption
of fixed grade values is that students can be ignorant about the distribution of abilities in the class
or they are of bounded rationality to discern the expected distribution of grades that results from the
grading rule set up by the teacher.
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performance. When discussing policy applications later in the text, the linear case serves
as a benchmark against the cases where 1) V (.) is convex (the teacher puts more weight
on high-ability students) and 2) V (.) is concave (the teacher puts more weight on low-
ability students). We make a technical assumption that the schedules of score and grade
allocations, {x(θ)} and {r(θ)}, are piecewise continuous functions. Finally, if a student
opts out of the class, then the job market assigns the ability of θL, which defines the
reservation utility of class participation.
3 Unobservable grading rules: Static model
In this section, we study a static teacher-student agency problem with grading rules
unobservable by the job market. Unobservability implies that the ability-signaling values
of grades are fixed and, thus, there is no interdependence of utilities across students.
As a result, the teacher finds grades not only costless but also abundant. Therefore, the
teacher-student relationship in this context turns alike a single-agent (i.e., single-student)
agency problem with hidden information. In particular, the teacher’s problem reduces to
screening ability types with the help of a grading rule. However, there is an important
difference with the canonical monopolistic screening problem. In our model, the transfer
(grade) enters only the student’s objective function.
Next, we characterize and solve the teacher’s problem of optimal grading, followed by
the discussion of the empirically relevant properties of the solution.
3.1 Teacher’s problem
By the Revelation Principle, we look for the grading rule that maximizes the student’s
expected knowledge among those rules that induce the student to reveal his type truth-
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fully:
max
{x(θ),r(θ)}
∫ θH
θL
x(θ)dF (θ)(1)
s.t.
ϕ(r(θ))− C(x(θ))
θ
≥ ϕ(r(θ̂))− C(x(θ̂))
θ
,(2)
ϕ(r(θ))− C(x(θ))
θ
≥ θL,(3)
0 ≤ r(θ) ≤ 1 for all θ and θ̂ in [θL, θH ] .(4)
Above, (2) is the student’s incentive compatibility constraint, (3) is the individual ratio-
nality constraint, and the last constraint imposes an upper bound on grades.
As grades do not enter the teacher’s objective function directly, we can transform the
problem by the one where the teacher rewards the student with ability signals ϕ̂ from
the closure of the range R(ϕ) of the grading standard ϕ(.). (We take the closure in order
to ensure the existence of a solution.) Given a signal schedule {ϕ̂(θ)}, the corresponding
grade schedule {r(θ)} can be inverted by {r(θ) = r : ϕ(r) = ϕ̂(θ)}. For analytical
convenience, we rewrite constraints (2) and (3) pre-multiplied by θ. Now, the teacher
looks for the grading rule {x(θ), ϕ̂(θ)} that maximizes her expected utility
max
{x(θ),ϕ̂(θ)}
∫ θH
θL
x(θ)dF (θ)(5)
s.t.
θϕ̂(θ)− C(x(θ)) ≥ θϕ̂(θ̂)− C(x(θ̂)),(6)
θ(ϕ̂(θ)− θL)− C(x(θ)) ≥ 0,(7)
ϕ̂(θ) ∈ R(ϕ) for all θ and θ̂ in [θL, θH ] .(8)
In this section, we assume that the range of the grading standard ϕ(.) comprises the
whole type space, i.e., R(ϕ) = [θL, θH ].
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Applying the standard constraint-simplification techniques, constraints (6) and (7)
can be equivalently expressed as
θϕ̂(θ)− C(x(θ)) = θ2L +
∫ θ
θL
ϕ̂(θ˜)dθ˜,(9)
ϕ̂(θ) is non-decreasing.(10)
First, in the optimum constraint (7) is binding for θ = θL, i.e., θLϕ̂(θL)−C(x(θL)) = θ2L.
Second, constraint (6) implies both (9) and (10), where the former implication follows
from the integral form envelope theorem (see Milgrom and Segal 2002). Lastly, it is
straightforward to demonstrate that (9) and (10) imply (6) and (7).
Letting U(θ) = θϕ̂(θ)− C(x(θ)), the teacher’s problem becomes
max
{θL≤ϕ̂(θ)≤θH ,U(θ)}
∫ θH
θL
C−1 (θϕ̂(θ)− U(θ)) f(θ)dθ(11)
s.t.
U ′(θ) = ϕ̂(θ),(12)
ϕ̂(θ) is non-decreasing.(13)
This maximization problem can be analyzed as an optimal control problem with U(θ)
as a state variable and ϕ̂(θ) as a control variable. Its solution is presented in the next
proposition.
Proposition 1 Let R(ϕ) = [θL, θH ]. The grading rule {x(θ), ϕ̂(θ)} that solves optimiza-
tion problem (5) is characterized by
x(θ) = C ′−1
(
f(θ)θ2C ′(x(θ∗))
f(θ∗)θ∗2
)
,(14)
ϕ̂(θ) = θL +
C(x(θ))
θ
+
∫ θ
θL
C(x(θ˜))
θ˜2
dθ˜(15)
for θ in [θL, θ
∗), where
(16) θ∗ = min{θ : θf(θ)− (1− F (θ)) ≥ 0, θ ∈ [θL, θH ]},
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and by x(θ) = x∗ and ϕ̂(θ) = θH for θ in [θ∗, θH ], where x∗ is determined from
(17) θH − C(x
∗)
θ∗
−
∫ θ∗
θL
C(x(θ))
θ2
dθ = θL.
Before we discuss solution properties, it is worthwhile drawing a parallel to the re-
lated problem of single-object pricing. The pricing problem takes a form similar to that
of problem (5), with the teacher interpreted as a seller and the student as a buyer. Then,
{x(θ)} reads as a payment schedule, and {ϕ̂(θ)}, with its range normalized to [0, 1], as a
probability schedule of selling the object to different valuation types θ. There is, however,
an important difference. In our model, a score x enters the student’s utility in the non-
linear way, whereas in the standard pricing model a payment x enters the buyer’s utility
linearly. This difference has a significant effect on the outcome. In the pricing model, the
sale occurs with probability 1 to types θ ≥ θ∗ and with probability zero to the rest. But
in our model, the bang-bang outcome is suboptimal as, technically, the Hamiltonian is
not linear in the control variable. Intuitively, with increasing marginal costs of effort the
gain from eliciting positive effort levels from excluded types outweighs the corresponding
loss that comes from the reduction of the effort level of the supramarginal types. Thus,
if interpreted in the price-setting language, we obtain that the seller sells the object with
probability 1 to the same types, θ ≥ θ∗, but he also sells it to types θ < θ∗ with a positive
probability.
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3.2 Solution properties
Pooling at the top
Proposition 1 shows that in the teacher’s optimum an interval of types, [θ∗, θH ], is pooled
for a uniform allocation.6 In other words,
Result 1 The teacher compresses most efficient types for the highest grade.
More generally, if the principal does not bear or internalize the cost of rewarding
the agent, then the optimal contract pools most efficient agent types. This finding is
not surprising even though in contrast to the ubiquitous “no pooling at the top” prop-
erty of optimal contracts with monetary incentives (and also with status incentives, see
Moldovanu, et al. 2007; Dubey and Geanakoplos 2010). Suppose it is the case that
only the most efficient type receives the highest reward. To make this allocation incentive
compatible, the principal has to suppress incentives for other types in order to prevent
the most efficient type from misreporting. Now, consider the principal marginally “tilt-
ing up” the schedule of score allocations against the corresponding decrease in the score
allocation of the most efficient type. As this decrease is weighted with a very small prob-
ability, it is certainly outweighed by the sum of increases in test scores of the other types.
Thus, the principal finds it optimal to increase the probability mass of agent types that
are subject to the highest reward until the gains and losses described offset each other.
Referring back to the teacher-student relationship, we show next that pooling the
most efficient types becomes more prevalent when the distribution of abilities is skewed
toward the end of low types.
6The interval [θ∗, θH ] is not empty as the starting point θ∗ is bound to be strictly less than θH .
Because of f(.) > 0 we have θHf(θH)−(1−F (θH)) > 0. Then, due to the monotone hazard rate and the
continuity of F (.) there must be some θ < θH such that 0 ≤ θf(θ)−(1−F (θ)) < θHf(θH)−(1−F (θH)).
15
Mismatch between grades and abilities
Consider two classes of students, A and B. In class A, students come from a population
where abilities are distributed according to FA(.) and in class B – according to FB(.)
over the same support. Denote the student types from the two classes by θA and θB,
respectively. Let θB be smaller than θA in the likelihood ratio order:
(18)
fB(θ)
fA(θ)
≤ fB(θ
′)
fA(θ′)
if θ < θ′ for all θ, θ′ in [θL, θH ] ,
where fA(.) and fB(.) are the probability density functions of the corresponding distri-
butions. The interpretation of this stochastic dominance condition is that students from
class A are held more able than those from class B. Formally, this condition implies
that
∫ θ′′
θ′ θfA(θ)dθ/(FA(θ
′′) − FA(θ′)) ≥
∫ θ′′
θ′ θfB(θ)dθ/(FB(θ
′′) − FB(θ′)) for any interval
[θ′, θ′′] ⊆ [θL, θH ]. In words, for any restriction of the ability space the expected student
ability in class A is greater than that in class B.
Let {xA(θ), ϕ̂A(θ)} and {xB(θ), ϕ̂B(θ)} be the optimal grading rules in the two classes,
respectively. We can establish the following relationship
Result 2 If (18) holds, then ϕ̂B(θ) ≥ ϕ̂A(θ) for every θ in [θL, θH ].
In words, a teacher with lower expectations about her students’ abilities should be more
lenient in grading. The intuition behind leniency in grading in weaker classes comes from
the teacher’s attempt to extract more effort from more numerous lower-ability students,
and vice versa.
Example
Results 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figure 1. It depicts the optimal grading rules for
two classes, where ability types in class A are distributed over [0.5, 1.5] according to the
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distribution with fA(θ) = θ and in class B uniformly. The effort cost function takes the
form of C(x) = x2/2. The top diagram shows the optimal score schedules and the bottom
diagram the optimal grade schedules. In both classes, the teachers pool most efficient
student types, but the teacher of class A pools fewer types but against a higher score. In
class B, besides more pooling, we have flatter schedules.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
4 Unobservable grading rules: Dynamic model
According to Result 1, the grade perceived to reveal the highest ability is given to a range
of different ability types. Obviously, this outcome cannot be equilibrium in the long run
as over time adjustment in grading standards will necessarily take place to account for any
mismatch between students’ grades and their abilities. Here, we introduce an adjustment
process of grading standards into the model. In every period, the ability-signaling value of
a grade is set to be equal to the average ability of students who received the grade in the
previous period. The assumption is that the job market uses the empirical distribution of
students’ abilities and grades from the previous period to make inference about students’
abilities in the current period. In this section, first, we are interested in the dynamics of
the optimal grading rule under the adaptive expectations and, then, in the properties of
consistent grading standards, defined as
Definition 1 A grading standard ϕ(.) is consistent if ϕ(r) is equal to the mean of types
θ that receive the grade r under the grading rule {x(θ), ϕ̂(θ)} that solves (5) with ϕ(.).
To begin with, we expand the static model with unobservable grading rules in the
following way. There is a large number of teachers. In every period t ∈ {1, 2, ...}, each
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teacher teaches a class of students coming from the same population so that all teachers
face the identical grading problem. An individual teacher’s grading practice has no effect
on the dynamics of grading standards and, therefore, in every period a teacher maximizes
her current expected utility only. Specifically, in period t a teacher sets up a grading rule
{xt(θ), ϕ̂t(θ)} that solves (5) under the current grading standard ϕt(.). In period t + 1,
grading standards adjust according to
(19) ϕt+1(r) = E(θ : ϕ̂t(θ) = ϕt(r)).
As it immediately follows from adjustment process (19), we can equivalently define a
consistent grading standard ϕt(.) as
Lemma 1 A grading standard ϕt(.) is consistent if and only if ϕt+1 = ϕt.
4.1 Dynamics
The job market’s temporal adjustments of its perception of grading standards have a
direct effect on available rewards at teachers’ disposal, so influencing teachers’ design
of grading rules. To illustrate the dynamics of grading rules, we start from that the
initial grading standard ϕ1(.) is a one-to-one strictly increasing mapping from grades to
abilities so that R(ϕ1) = [θL, θH ]. A teacher’s optimal grading rule {x1(θ), ϕ̂1(θ)} is given
by Proposition 1: pooling the types in [θ∗1, θH ], where θ
∗
1 = θ
∗ from (16), and screening the
remaining types. In period t = 2, the range of rewards under the new grading standard
ϕ2(.) shrinks to R(ϕ2) = [θL, θ∗1] ∪ θ∗1, where θ∗1 = E(θ ∈ [θ∗1, θH ]) denotes the mean of
the types that receive the highest grade under {x1(θ), ϕ̂1(θ)}. Now, we solve problem (5)
with ϕ2(.) for the optimal grading rule {x2(θ), ϕ̂2(θ)} in period t = 2.
Because the range of rewards, R(ϕ2), consists of an interval and a distinct point,
the teacher searches for the starting point of the pooling-at-the-top interval, denoted by
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θ2, and signal allocations ϕ̂2(θ) for θ ≤ θ2 subject to ϕ̂2(θ) ≤ θ∗1. (Note that θ∗1 is the
second-highest reward the teacher can give under the grading standard ϕ2(.).) By the
integral form envelope theorem, the optimal score allocations x2(θ) for θ ≤ θ2 take the
form of
(20) x2(θ) = C
−1
(
θϕ̂2(θ)−
∫ θ
θL
ϕ̂2(θ˜)dθ˜ − θ2L
)
.
The types in (θ2, θH ] receive the signal allocation of ϕ(θ) = θ∗1 and their score allocation
is given by
(21) x2 = C
−1
(
θ2θ∗1 −
∫ θ2
θL
ϕ̂2(θ˜)dθ˜ − θ2L
)
.
The Lagrangian of the teacher’s problem is
(22) L(ϕ̂2(θ), θ2, µ(θ)) =
∫ θ2
θL
x2(θ)f(θ)dθ + x2(1− F (θ2)) + µ(θ)(θ∗1 − ϕ̂2(θ)),
where µ(θ) is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint that ϕ̂2(θ) ≤ θ∗1 for θ ≤ θ2.
The optimal starting point, θ∗2, is characterized by the first-order condition
(23)
θ∗1 − ϕ̂2(θ∗2)
C ′ (x2)
1− F (θ∗2)
f(θ∗2)
= x2 − x2(θ∗2).
Condition (23) is analogous to pooling condition (16) in the case of the convex range
R(ϕ). Because C−1(.) is strictly concave, it implies that
(24)
θ∗2
(
θ∗1 − ϕ̂2(θ∗2)
)
C ′ (x2)
< x2 − x2(θ∗2) <
θ∗2
(
θ∗1 − ϕ̂2(θ∗2)
)
C ′ (x2(θ∗2))
.
Then, given (24), the first-order condition in (23) renders
(25)
1− F (θ∗2)
θ∗2f(θ
∗
2)
> 1,
which in turn implies θ∗2 < θ
∗
1. (Recall that (1 − F (θ∗1))/(θ∗1f(θ∗1)) = 1.) Thus, we get
more types pooled for the highest grade, which is due to the gap between the highest
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and second-highest rewards. The reason is that the teacher increases the mass of types
subject to the highest reward as inframarginal types are bound for significantly lower
rewards and, thus, lower scores.
Now consider the allocations for the remaining types, where the first-order condition
with respect to ϕ̂2(θ), θ ≤ θ∗2, is
(26)
θf(θ)
C ′(x2(θ))
−
∫ θ∗2
θ
f(θ˜)
C ′(x2(θ˜))
dθ˜ − 1− F (θ
∗
2)
C ′ (x2)
= µ(θ).
The last term of the left-hand side is strictly smaller than (θ∗2f(θ
∗
2))/C
′(x2(θ∗2)) because
of (23) and (24). Hence, at θ = θ∗2 the left-hand side of (26) is positive, implying that
µ(θ∗2) > 0 or ϕ̂2(θ
∗
2) = θ
∗
1. By the monotonicity of a score schedule and the continuity of
F (.), the multiplier µ(θ) stays positive for a range of types. The gains from a marginal
increase in effort levels for types close to θ∗2 outweigh the corresponding reductions of
effort levels for higher types. This implies a second interval of types pooled for θ∗1 and,
thus, a further coarsening of grading.
To complete the characterization of the optimal grading rule {x2(θ), ϕ̂2(θ)}, let θ∗2,2
denote the starting point of the second pooling interval, (θ∗2,2, θ
∗
2]. All the types in this
interval receive the allocation (x2(θ
∗
2), θ
∗
1). Types θ ≤ θ∗2,2 are screened and their optimal
score allocations x2(θ) are determined by (26) with µ(θ) = 0. The type θ
∗
2,2 is found from
(26) and (17) in Proposition 1, where θ∗ is replaced with θ∗2,2, x
∗ with x2(θ∗2), and x(θ)
with x2(θ). Finally, the uniform score allocations, x2 and x2(θ
∗
2), are pinned down by
(23) and the corresponding incentive compatibility constraint.
In the next period, t = 3, the job market adopts a new grading standard, ϕ3(.)
according to (19). Then, teachers choose a new grading rule, {x3(θ), ϕ̂3(θ)}, that solves
problem (5) with ϕ3(.). The range of rewards available to teachers, R(ϕ3), consists of an
interval of types and two distinct points that are equal to the expected types of the two
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pooling intervals in {x2(θ), ϕ̂2(θ)}, respectively. A teacher looks for the optimal starting
points of two pooling intervals, in which types receive the two distinct ability signals,
respectively, and for signal allocations for the remaining types. But, as we show in the
proof of the next result, the teacher pools an additional interval of types. For the same
reason, this pattern reoccurs in subsequent periods: the teacher always pools a range of
types for the highest ability signal from the interval of available signals. We numerically
illustrate this dynamics later in the text.
The algorithm, described above, is repeated until a consistent grading standard is
obtained, i.e., ϕt+1 = ϕt. The convergence of the adjustment process can be immedi-
ately established when the optimal expected score decreases over time, E(xt) ≥ E(xt+1).
This property, together with the existence of a lower bound (the expected score in any
period cannot be lower than the expected score under complete pooling), implies that
the sequence {E(xt)} must converge. The convergence of {E(xt)} implies, in turn, the
convergence of the adjustment process and, thus, the existence of a convergent grading
standard ϕ(.). At the same time, the monotonicity property E(xt) ≥ E(xt+1) follows
from the revealed preference argument when in consecutive periods there is no improve-
ment in available ability signals at teachers’ disposal.7 Next, we discuss properties of a
consistent grading standard, followed by numerical analysis.
7In some irregular cases, the monotonicity property can, however, be violated. Consider a current
grading standard with two pooling intervals only and thus two grades available. If the cost function C(.)
is locally very convex, the teacher may find it optimal to pool fewer types for the highest reward compared
to the previous period. This would lead to an improvement in available rewards for the following period
and possibly a higher expected score. We do not explore such cases here.
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4.2 Consistent grading standards
The next result shows that the observations made when deriving the optimal grading
rule in period t = 2 can be generalized as the properties of a consistent grading standard.
This result will prove useful in characterizing these standards.
Result 3 Given a consistent grading standard, teachers
(i) do not separate any interval of types,
(ii) pool more types for the highest grade than in period t = 1.
As we show in the proof, a grading standard that perfectly screens an interval of types
cannot be consistent. If such an interval existed, the teacher would pool some types for
the highest ability signal available in this interval. Generally, effort extraction from lower
types dominates distortions imposed on higher types. Thus, when individual grading rules
are unobservable and separately have no effect on the dynamics of grading standards, the
practice of coarse grading will emerge over time. Part (ii) of Result 3 points to the
direction of grade inflation as the highest grade is assigned to more students. As already
mentioned in the discussion of the grading problem in period t = 2, this result is a
consequence of a gap that arises between the values of the highest and the second-highest
grades and the convexity of the cost function C(.). The dynamics of the pooling-at-the-
top interval is numerically explored in the next subsection.
Now, drawing on part (i) of Result 3, we are able to offer a succinct characterization of
consistent grading standards as it is sufficient to analyze standards with pooling intervals
only. We use a partition θ = (θ0, θ1, ..., θn−1, θn) of the type space,
(27) θL = θ0 ≤ θ1 ≤ ... ≤ θn−1 ≤ θn = θH ,
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to express a grading standard with n pooling intervals, [θi−1, θi], i = 1, ..., n. Let Θn
denote the set of all possible partitions θ satisfying (27). A grading standard θ ∈ Θn with
n distinct pooling intervals defines n distinct grades that a teacher finds at her disposal.
The ability-signaling values of these grades are given by the function ϕ : Θn → [θL, θH ]n,
where
(28) ϕi(θ) =
∫ θi
θi−1
θf(θ)dθ
F (θi)− F (θi−1)
is the expected ability in interval i, i.e., in [θi−1, θi], i = 1, ..., n. We write ϕ0(θ) = θL.
Given a grading standard θ ∈ Θn with n distinct intervals, any feasible grading rule
can also be characterized by a partition θ′ ∈ Θn because at most n distinct grades are
available. The teacher’s expected utility from a grading rule θ′ is given by the function
G : Θn ×Θn → R defined as
(29) G(θ′;θ) =
n∑
i=1
pii(θ
′)xi(θ′;θ),
where pii(θ
′) = F (θ′i)− F (θ′i−1) is the probability weight on the score
(30) xi(θ
′;θ) = C−1
(
i∑
j=1
θ′j−1(ϕj(θ)−ϕj−1(θ))
)
.
A grading standard θ is consistent if
(31) θ = arg max
θ′∈Θn
G(θ′;θ).
In particular, a consistent grading standard θ with n distinct pooling intervals exists only
if it is an interior solution to problem (31). In other words, it solves the system of n− 1
equations, derived from the first-order conditions with respect to θ′i, i = 1, ..., n− 1,
(32)
ϕi+1(θ)−ϕi(θ)
f(θi)
n∑
j=i+1
pij(θ)
C ′(xj(θ;θ))
= xi+1(θ;θ)− xi(θ;θ)
with (27) satisfied with strict inequalities.
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4.3 Numerical analysis
Here, we present a numerical analysis of the dynamics of grading rules done by extending
the two examples from the previous section. The main purpose is to show how our model
can produce grade inflation.8
Figure 2 illustrates the case when types are uniformly distributed over [0.5, 1.5]. The
optimal grading rule in period t is shown as a partition of the type space. The rightmost
interval stands for the pooling interval at the top, with its score allocation x indicated
above it. The screening interval is marked with “Screen.” As we can see, the screening
interval disappears already in period t = 3, with only two pooling intervals left, [0.5, 0.62]
and (0.62, 1.5]. Over time, the latter expands at the expense of the former yielding grade
inflation: In every period, the highest grade is given to more students and for a lower
score x. Ultimately, the consistent grading standard we get is the one that pools the
whole type space.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Figure 3 illustrates the case when the distribution of types has a linear density func-
tion, f(θ) = θ. The dynamics of optimal grading rules is shown for six periods, all of
which follow the same pattern. The screening interval shrinks, an additional pooling
8To demonstrate grade inflation, we resort to numerical methods rather than analytical ones. Ana-
lytical analysis is hardly tractable in our model because of, among other things, non-convex and variable
choice set R(ϕ). Drawing on part (i) of Result (3), one analytical way to proceed would be to specify
the conditions when a teacher’s expected utility function G(θ′;θ) in (29) is supermodular in θ′ and has
increasing differences in all θ′i and θj . This would imply monotone comparative statics, which is the
expansion of pooling intervals. However, for G(θ′;θ) to have the desired properties, which are, equiva-
lently, non-negative cross derivatives, it requires imposing endogenous restrictions on the cost function
C(.) and distribution F (.).
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interval appears, and the pooling interval at the top expands with its score x decreasing.
For this example, the derivation of a consistent grading standard through iteration is not
attempted because of the increasing complexity of the problem. Instead, we use (32) to
calculate consistent grading standards. Several are possible, e.g., one with the partition
(0.5, 0.568, 0.649, 0.689, 0.792, 1.5) has five distinct pooling intervals.9
[Insert Figure 3 here]
5 Observable grading rules
This section deals with the situation when the job market observes the grading rule
applied and can correctly infer a student’s expected ability. In particular, the utility of
a grade is given by the average ability of students who receive the grade. Thus, unlike
in the case with unobservable grading rules, there is no independence of utilities among
students anymore. Here, a more lenient grading rule translates into lower values of grades
and, as a result, adversely affects students’ choice of learning effort. Below, we analyze
when this downside effect of lenient grading outweighs the upside effect – more effort
extraction from lower types. The model with observable grading rules closely resembles
the benchmark model of Rayo (2013) on the monopolistic signal provision of conspicuous
consumption, upon which we closely draw whenever possible.
Next, we start with defining the teacher’s problem of optimal grading under observable
grading rules and, then, discuss conditions for separation of students’ abilities.
9A consistent standard with more pooling intervals could not be found.
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5.1 Teacher’s problem
Given a grading rule {x(θ), r(θ)}, define a function γ : [θL, θH ]→ [θL, θH ] by
(33) γ(θ) = E
[
θ̂ : r(θ̂) = r(θ)
]
.
The value γ(θ) is equal to the mean of the types θ̂ for which the grading rule prescribes
the grade r(θ). When all types report truthfully, γ(θ) determines the expected ability
inferred by the market and, thus, a student’s utility from the grade r(θ). In definition
(33), the grade allocation r(.) can be equivalently replaced by the corresponding score
allocation x(.)
(34) γ(θ) = E [θ′ : x(θ′) = x(θ)] .
Therefore, it is sufficient to analyze grading rules in a reduced form, i.e., as {x(θ)} only.
The teacher’s problem is to find the score schedule {x(θ)} that maximizes
max
{x(θ)}
∫ θH
θL
x(θ)dF (θ)(35)
s.t.
θγ(θ)− C(x(θ)) ≥ θγ(θ̂)− C(x(θ̂)),(36)
θ(γ(θ)− θL)− C(x(θ)) ≥ 0, for all θ and θ̂ in [θL, θH ] ,(37)
where (36) and (37) are the student’s incentive compatibility and individual rational-
ity constraints, respectively, pre-multiplied by θ. Next, we start with transforming the
teacher’s problem (35) into the equivalent problem that is maximized with respect to
ability signal schedule {γ(θ)}. The set of feasible ability signal schedules under incentive
compatibility, which we denote by Γ, is characterized by the following condition
(38) γ(θ) = E[θ̂ : γ(θ̂) = γ(θ)],
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which is similar in meaning to (33).
As before, we replace all the incentive compatibility and individual rationality con-
straints with
x(θ) = C−1
(
θγ(θ)−
∫ θ
θL
γ(θ˜)dθ˜ − θ2L
)
(39)
x(θ) is non-decreasing.(40)
From (39) the score allocation x(θ) is non-decreasing in θ if and only if γ(θ) is non-
decreasing. Thus, the teacher’s problem can be expressed as finding the signal schedule
{γ(θ)} that maximizes
max
{γ(θ)}∈Γ
∫ θH
θL
C−1
(
θγ(θ)−
∫ θ
θL
γ(θ˜)dθ˜ − θ2L
)
dF (θ)(41)
s.t. γ(θ) is non-decreasing.
5.2 Solution properties
The teacher’s problem (41) can be interpreted as determining the intervals of pooling and
separation of types. Similarly to Rayo (2013), the teacher needs to take into account
three effects pooling has on the expected score relative to separation. First, student types
at the low end of a pooling interval can be made to exert a higher effort because their
type inferred is higher than that under separation. Conversely, the second effect is that
student types at the high end of the pooling interval will exert a lower effort than that
under separation. Finally, the third effect comes from changes in score allocations for
the supramarginal types (to the right from the pooling interval). All in all, the teacher
chooses to pool the types in a given interval if the joint outcome of the three effects is
positive.
Problem (41) with a linear cost function C(.) is analyzed in Rayo (2013). He provides
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a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of full separation of types, i.e.,
γ(θ) = θ. For our specification of the model with linear C(.), this condition requires
θ − (1 − F (θ))/f(θ) be non-decreasing for γ(θ) = θ to be the solution. However, with
a nonlinear cost function C(.) there is no succinct characterization of the full separation
condition. One of the factors determining the results for our model is whether the score
schedule in (39) is convex under separation. In particular, the convexity is a sufficient
condition for no pooling at the top.
Proposition 2 If {x(θ)} in (39) with γ(θ) = θ is convex over [θ, θH ], θL ≤ θ < θH , then
there is θ′ ∈ [θ, θH) such that γ(θ) = θ is the solution to (41) for all θ ∈ [θ′, θH ].
The idea of the proof is that, once the convexity condition is met, a grading rule
containing a uniform allocation at the top can be improved upon by separating those types
with distinct allocations. In terms of the three effects discussed above, with convexity
the second effect dominates the first one, whereas the third is absent (because there are
no supramarginal types). The convexity condition is equivalent to that the marginal
disutility from learning decreases in ability
(42)
d
dθ
(
Cx(x(θ))
θ
)
< 0
or, after differentiating and dropping the arguments,
(43) Cxx ≤
(
Cx
θ
)2
.
In other words, the score schedule {x(θ)} in (39) is convex under separation if the cost
function C(.) is not “too convex.” (For instance, this condition is met for a quadratic
cost function.)
The convexity condition in (43) is, however, not sufficient for γ(θ) = θ to be the
solution to the teacher’s problem. As in Rayo (2013), pooling may be, nevertheless,
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optimal on the interior of the type space. The decision to pool the types in a given
interval depends on the joint outcome of the three effects of pooling. The convexity
condition ensures that the sum of the first two effects is negative for pooling, but the
third effect is ambiguous and depends on the distribution F (.). The next proposition
states a necessary condition for the third effect to be negative, which together with the
convexity condition determines a sufficient condition for the optimality of full separation.
Proposition 3 If (43) holds and for any interval [θ1, θ2] ⊆ [θL, θH ] we have
(44)
∫ θ2
θ1
θdF (θ)
F (θ2)− F (θ1) ≥
∫ θ2
θ1
θdθ
θ2 − θ1 ,
then γ(θ) = θ is the solution to (41).
Literally, condition (44) states that the distribution F (.) stochastically dominates the
uniform distribution in the likelihood ratio order.10 Economically, this condition requires
that the sum of information rents obtained by the types pooled in [θ1, θ2] be larger than
the information rents obtained under separation. This leads to the third effect, i.e.,
changes in allocations for supramarginal types, being negative for pooling as compared
to separation. For the numerical examples studied above, conditions (43) and (44) both
hold implying the optimality of perfect screening with observable grading rules.
All in all, the observability of grading rules makes an enormous impact on the form
of the optimal grading rule. The compression of grades among the most efficient types
10The uniform distribution arises as a consequence of the assumption about the functional form of the
cost function: C(x)/θ. With a more general specification, C(x)/v(θ) with v(.) > 0 and v′(.) > 0, the
condition equivalent to (44) is ∫ θ2
θ1
θdF (θ)
F (θ2)− F (θ1) ≥
∫ θ2
θ1
θdv(θ)
v(θ2)− v(θ1) .
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no longer holds with observability unless the cost function is very steep. In general, the
resultant interdependence of student utilities induces the teacher to differentiate student
types at a greater rate than in the case with unobservable grading rules. Gains from
lenient grading in the form of more effort extraction from lower types do not outweigh
losses arising from the degrading of grade values by the job market.
6 Discussion
First, we demonstrate that the findings of our models with unobservable grading rules
closely match the ubiquitously observed grading patterns of 1) grade compression, 2)
grade inflation, and 3) mismatch between students’ grades and their abilities. We also
relate our findings to the discretization of grades and the reduction of study time. Second,
we discuss policy applications.
6.1 Main findings
Grade compression
Grade compression stands for the practice of coarse grading when teachers tend to rely
on a few marks to assess students’ performance. Our model with unobservable grading
rules offers a rational explanation for this practice. The argument is based on the costless
nature of grades as incentives. First, the teacher finds it average knowledge maximizing to
compress the most efficient types for the highest reward as argued when deriving Result
1. Then, perfect screening is never optimal in the long run as we show by Result 3. With
unobservable grading rules, teachers face the commitment problem of not exploiting the
costlessness of grades even when grading standards are subsequently adjusted. Eventually,
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teachers are bound to expand the range of ability types that are subject to better grades
because of the diminished incentive effects of lower grades. This argument can also be
taken as an explanation for the usage of discrete grading scales.
Compressed rewards pertain not only to the teacher-student relationship. Consider,
for instance, the well-documented compression of ratings phenomenon at job performance
appraisals (see Murphy and Cleveland 1995; Prendergast 1999). Our static model
with costless rewards can also be related to this phenomenon. In firms practicing job
performance appraisal systems, a line manager rates the performance of her employees,
whose pay is determined by their ratings received. However, it is not a line manager that
bears the resultant payroll cost but the firm (or rather its residual claimants). Hence, if
a line manager has an interest in eliciting more effort from her employee then they may
find themselves in an agency relationship that features costless rewards. Along the same
lines of our argument for grade compression, the compression of ratings can arise in the
line manager’s optimum.
Grade inflation
The model with unobservable grading rules also addresses grade inflation, an increasing
frequency of high grades without an accompanying rise in student ability or effort.11 From
our analysis we can distinguish two contributing factors toward the increasing degree of
leniency in grading. The first factor pertains to shifts in the distribution of student
abilities toward the lower end of the ability space (Result 2). The second factor is the
aggravation of teachers’ commitment problem (Result 3).
Both factors can originate from the same source, namely, the expanding availability of
11See, e.g., Sabot and Wakeman-Linn (1991); Kuh and Hu (1999); Johnson (2003).
31
education.12 In recent decades, due to an increasing number of educational institutions
and study programs, a larger number of study places has been offered with the impli-
cation that a larger number of low-ability applicants is enrolled.13 Subsequently, this
can lead to the emergence of the first factor discussed. Similarly, with more issuers of
educational certificates, individual grading rules carry a lesser weight on the perception
of the job market about grading standards applied, thus, resulting in the second factor –
the commitment problem.
Finally, the numerical analysis of the dynamic model with unobservable grading rules
shows a reduction in students’ test scores and, accordingly, learning effort levels over time.
This result is consistent with the empirical study of Babcock and Marks (2011), where
they report that over the period 1961–2003 time spent for study by full-time students in
the US gradually decreased from 40 to 27 hours.
Mismatch between grades and abilities
The model with unobservable grading rules is also consistent with the empirical obser-
vation that teachers of classes with less able students apply more lenient grading rules
and vice versa, see Goldman and Widawski (1976); Strenta and Elliott (1987); Johnson
(2003).14 Drawing on Result 2, this observation can be the outcome of the optimal design
12See footnote 5 for empirical evidence and McKenzie and Tullock (1981, Ch. 17) for other discussion.
13Wilson (1999) reports declining college entrance test scores. There is also a steadily increasing
number of students enrolled in US degree-granting institutions both in absolute and relative (as a
percentage of high school graduates) numbers: see Table 200 of 2009 Digest of Education Statistics,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09 188.asp.
14Goldman and Widawski (1976) report a negative correlation between students’ Scholastic Aptitude
Test scores (a proxy measure of students’ abilities) and the grading standards in the classes the students
were majoring in. According to this study (conducted at the University of California, Riverside), the
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of grading rules and not necessarily the outcome of teachers’ rent-seeking behavior, as
sometimes is suggested (e.g., Johnson 1997). Our model predicts that in weak classes
the optimal grading rule makes high grades more easily attainable in order to elicit more
effort from more numerous lower-ability students. This, correspondingly, results in a
mismatch and low correlation between students’ grades and their abilities.
Concerning the normative side of the differential grading standards discussed, there
is a number of papers proposing grade adjustment mechanisms (see, e.g., Johnson 1997)
aimed at making grades more informative of students’ actual abilities. Without going
into the details of this literature, it is worth noting that it is typically assumed that the
reason for differential grading standards lies with some personal features of the instructor
(e.g., the adaptation level, unwillingness to spend office hours on dealing with students’
complaints about low grades, etc.). Therefore, proposed grade adjustment mechanisms
would attempt to correct for presumed instructor-specific factors failing to recognize
the possible endogeneity of those factors, which could lead mechanisms astray from the
projected goals.
Interestingly, Result 2 also points to the presence of indirect peer effects. A student’s
allocation (grade and score) depends on the teacher’s grading rule applied. At the same
time, the form of the grading rule depends on the student’s peers or rather their abil-
ities. Hence, peers can also matter indirectly – through the grading rule designed by
the teacher. An interesting research question would be the disentanglement of direct
(typically studied) and indirect (suggested here) peer effects.
negative correlation observed is the consequence of that professors in fields with more high-ability students
tend to grade more stringently. These empirical findings were confirmed by similar studies conducted at
Dartmouth College (Strenta and Elliott 1987) and at Duke University (Johnson 2003).
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6.2 Policy applications
Merit-pay programs for high school teachers have been recently introduced in different
countries to foster teachers’ incentives to elicit more effort from students, see Lavy (2002,
2009); Atkinson, et al. (2004); Lazear (2003). Typically, these programs offer monetary
bonuses to teachers if their students improve upon their previous performance as measured
by their scores on standardized tests. The goals pursued by the developers of such
programs range from improving average performance (in most cases) to reducing the gap
between bad and good performers as, e.g., in the “No Child Left Behind” initiative in
the US.
In terms of our modeling framework, incentives set by merit-pay programs can have
a direct effect on the form of the teacher’s utility function V (.). In the case of “No Child
Left Behind” the utility function V (.) can turn concave because the teacher would start
putting relatively more weight on the performance of lower-ability students. Then, with a
concave utility function V (.) the model with costless grades predicts that the gap between
low- and high-ability students would diminish as compared to the case of a linear utility.
However, this reduction would come from two directions: more effort from low-ability
students and less effort from those with high abilities.15 Hence, a negative externality
15Denote the optimal score schedule of the solution to the teacher’s problem (5) with a strictly concave
utility function V (.) by {xV (θ)}. With a reference to Proposition 1 and its proof, the optimal score
allocations xV (θ) for θ in [θL, θ
∗) are equal to
xV (θ) = C ′−1
(
f(θ)θ2V ′(xV (θ))C ′(xV (θ∗))
f(θ∗)θ∗2V ′(xV (θ∗))
)
.
Using the revealed preference argument and straightforward analytical manipulations, we can show that
xV (θ∗) < x(θ∗) and xV (θL) > x(θL), where x(θ∗) and x(θL) are the optimal allocations from the linear
case. Hence, with a strictly concave utility V (.), the range of scores contracts. And this contraction
comes from both directions: optimal allocations become lower for able students and higher for less able
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can arise from the introduction of such programs. In contrast, the gap between bad and
good performers can increase if the teacher’s utility function turns convex – as a result,
e.g., of a merit-pay program that rewards for excellence.
With the help of our models, we can also address the problem whether university ad-
ministration should restrict teachers’ choice of grading rules by imposing relative grading
such as grading on a curve. In the case of observable grading rules, grading on a curve is
superfluous if not harmful when there is a homogenous group of students; a similar pre-
diction is also made by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2010). However, under a more realistic
scenario of unobservable grading rules, grading on a curve could possibly fix teachers’
commitment problem. But then, the question is what goal university administration
pursues. If it is the maximization of students’ knowledge, then grading on a curve or
the disclosure of grade distributions would be a desirable policy. But if administration
aims for a higher average job placement, then, as argued by Chan, et al. (2007) and
Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010), compressed grades are a sought-after outcome. In this
case, administration would not provide incentives for teachers to differentiate among their
students, thus, refraining from grading on a curve and disclosing any information about
class grade distribution.16
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we approach the teacher-student relationship from the perspectives of
ability screening and knowledge maximization. We show that many empirical grading
students.
16For more discussion and empirical implications of making academic transcripts more informative,
see Bar, et al. (2009).
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patterns such as grade compression, grade inflation, or mismatch between students’ grades
and abilities are consistent with the predictions of our agency model that has grades as
costless incentives. When the job market makes a judgment about students’ grades based
on a standard other than the actual grading rule applied, a teacher chooses a lenient
grading rule to induce more effort from less able students, thus, yielding coarse grading.
This effect turns more important in less able classes, and vice versa. When the job market
adaptively adjusts its perception of grading standards, the practice of coarse grading can
unravel over time until the point when no type is screened. In their attempts to motivate
students, teachers are bound to increase leniency in grading because of depreciating values
of grades arising from the commitment problem, which has ultimately implications for
grade inflation. Finally, we suggest that the modeling framework presented here can serve
as microfoundations for the purpose of policy applications.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Omitting monotonicity constraint (13) and the constraint ϕ̂(θ) ≥ θL, the Hamiltonian of
the reduced problem is
(45) H(ϕ̂, U, λ, µ, θ) = C−1 (θϕ̂− U) f(θ) + λϕ̂+ µ(θH − ϕ̂),
where λ(θ) is the co-state variable associated with (12) and µ(θ) is the Lagrange multiplier
for ϕ̂(θ) ≤ θH . The necessary conditions for the optimal control problem, which are also
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sufficient because C−1(.) is concave, imply that
θf(θ)
C ′(x(θ))
+ λ(θ)− µ(θ) = 0,(46)
f(θ)
C ′(x(θ))
= λ′(θ),(47)
U ′(θ) = ϕ̂(θ),(48)
λ(θH) = 0,(49)
where x(θ) = C−1(θϕ̂(θ)−U(θ)). The condition (47) follows from Pontryagin’s maximum
principle and (49) is the transversality condition.
From (46) and (49), we get µ(θH) > 0 implying that ϕ̂(θH) = θH . The state variable
U(θ), which is the student’s net utility, is strictly increasing in θ and also continuous as
(upward) jumps cannot be optimal for the teacher (she wants to keep the net utility as
low as possible). Then, by the continuity of U(θ) and the assumed piecewise continuity
of the control variable, the co-state variable λ(θ) is continuous. This implies that the
multiplier µ(θ) remains positive for an interval of types that are pooled for the highest
reward. Denote this interval by (θ∗, θH ] and the corresponding uniform allocation by
(x∗, θH). From (47) and (49), we obtain that for θ > θ∗
(50) λ(θ) = −1− F (θ)
C ′(x∗)
,
which renders (46) to satisfy
(51)
θf(θ)
C ′(x∗)
− 1− F (θ)
C ′(x∗)
> 0.
The last expression implies that the starting point of the pooling interval θ∗ is given by
(52) θ∗ = min{θ : θf(θ)− (1− F (θ)) ≥ 0, θ ∈ [θL, θH ]}.
As a consequence, we can establish that µ(θ) = 0 for θ ≤ θ∗.
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Suppose that θ∗ > θL holds (if θ∗ = θL, all types are pooled). For θ ≤ θ∗ (46) becomes
(53)
θf(θ)
C ′ (x(θ))
−
(∫ θ∗
θ
f(θ˜)
C ′(x(θ˜))
dθ˜ − 1− F (θ
∗)
C ′ (x∗)
)
= 0,
where the expression in the brackets stands for λ(θ) obtained from (47). Differentiating
with respect to θ renders
(54) 2
f(θ)
C ′ (x(θ))
+ θ
d
dθ
(
f(θ)
C ′ (x(θ))
)
= 0.
Solving for x(θ), θ ∈ [θL, θ∗], we get
(55) x(θ) = C ′−1
(
f(θ)θ2
C ′(x(θ∗))
f(θ∗)θ∗2
)
.
To find the allocation x(θ∗), consider (46) at θ = θ∗
(56) λ(θ∗) = − θ
∗f(θ∗)
C ′(x(θ∗))
.
From (50) the right-hand limit of λ(θ) is
(57) lim
θ→θ∗
λ(θ) = −1− F (θ
∗)
C ′(x∗)
.
By the continuity of the co-state variable we obtain that x(θ∗) = x∗, which implies that
the optimal score schedule is continuous.
The optimal signal allocations ϕ̂(θ) for θ ∈ [θL, θ∗) are most easily determined from
the integral form envelope condition applied to initial incentive compatibility constraint
(2):
(58) ϕ̂(θ) = θL +
C(x(θ))
θ
+
∫ θ
θL
C(x(θ˜))
θ˜2
dθ˜.
Given ϕ̂(θ∗) = θH , we can from (58) at θ = θ∗ integrate out the score allocation x∗.
Next, we establish that the omitted monotonicity constraint holds. For this purpose
it suffices to show that the score schedule x(θ) in (55) is non-decreasing. Because C ′(.)
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is increasing, so is its inverse C ′−1(.). Hence, for x(θ) to be non-decreasing we need that
the argument of C ′−1(.) in (55) is non-decreasing in θ, i.e., d [f(θ)θ2] /dθ ≥ 0. From (52)
it follows that f(θ)θ/(1− F (θ)) < 1 for θ in [θ, θ∗), and from the monotone hazard rate:
f ′(θ) > −f 2(θ)/(1 − F (θ)). The two properties together ensure that d [f(θ)θ2] /dθ ≥ 0
holds, implying that x′(θ) ≥ 0. The omitted constraint ϕ̂(θ) ≥ θL holds from (58).
Proof of Result 2
Let θ∗i denote the starting point of the pooling-at-the-top interval in class i, i = A,B,
defined by (16) in Proposition 1. If θ∗B = θL, then the proposition holds trivially. Suppose
θ∗B > θL. Because the likelihood-ratio stochastic order implies the hazard-rate order (see
Shaked and Shanthikumar 1994), which is fA(θ)/(1 − FA(θ)) ≤ fB(θ)(1 − FB(θ)) for
every θ, it immediately follows that θ∗A ≥ θ∗B. In the less able class B, there is more
pooling at the top. Thus, we have ϕ̂B(θ) = θH ≥ ϕ̂A(θ) for θ ∈ [θ∗B, θH ].
Consider the optimal score schedules {xA(θ)} and {xB(θ)} and suppose that they
are not identical (otherwise, the proposition holds trivially). Because the schedules are
continuous, they must cross at least once. (Otherwise, the lower score schedule would
not be optimal.) Let θ be the left-most crossing point. We separately consider two cases:
1) θ ≥ θ∗B, and 2) θ < θ∗B.
In case 1, θ ≥ θ∗B, it must be that either xB(θ) > xA(θ) or xB(θ) < xA(θ) for θ < θ.
The latter is impossible because then we never have xB(θ) > xA(θ) required for the
optimality of {xB(θ)} as xB(θ) stays constant for θ ≥ θ while xA(θ) is non-decreasing.
Thus, it must be that xB(θ) > xA(θ) for θ < θ. From (15) in Proposition 1 it follows
that ϕ̂A(θ) < ϕ̂B(θ) for θ < θ
∗
B ≤ θ, proving the proposition for case 1.
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In case 2, θ < θ∗B, by (14) in Proposition 1 we have
(59) C ′−1
(
fA(θ)θ
2MA
)
= C ′−1
(
fB(θ)θ
2MB
)
,
where Mi = C
′(x∗i )/(fi(θ
∗
i )θ
∗2
i ), i = A,B. It yields
(60)
fA(θ)
fB(θ)
=
MB
MA
.
Due to the assumed likelihood-ratio stochastic order, we get fA(θ)/fB(θ) ≥ MB/MA for
all θ > θ implying that xA(θ) ≥ xB(θ) for all θ ≥ θ and xA(θ) < xB(θ) for all θ < θ.
Hence, by (15) in Proposition 1, it follows that ϕ̂A(θ) < ϕ̂B(θ) for θ ≤ θ.
What remains to be proved is ϕ̂A(θ) ≤ ϕ̂B(θ) for θ ∈ (θ, θ∗B). To invoke a contradic-
tion, suppose that for some θ˜ ∈ (θ, θ∗B) we have ϕ̂A(θ˜) > ϕ̂B(θ˜). Because xA(θ) ≥ xB(θ)
for θ ≥ θ˜ > θ, then due to (15) in Proposition 1 we must have ϕ̂A(θ) > ϕ̂B(θ) for all
θ ≥ θ˜. But it is a contradiction because ϕ̂A(θ) ≤ ϕ̂B(θ) for θ ∈ [θ∗B, θH ] as shown above.
Proof of Result 3
First, we show that a consistent grading standard ϕt(.) with (some) perfect screening
of types is impossible (Part (i)). To invoke a contradiction, suppose there exists such a
consistent grading standard ϕt(.) that screens the types in an interval [θL, θt,1] and pools
types in intervals (θt,1, θt,2], (θt,2, θt,3], ..., (θt,n, θH ]. (There must be some pooling at the top
as we have previously shown.) The closure of its range is R(ϕt) = [θL, θt,1]∪θt,1∪ ...∪θt,n,
where θt,i = E(θ ∈ (θt,i, θt,i+1]), i = 1, ..., n and θt,n+1 = θH . Setting the starting point
of the screening interval at a point other than θL has no impact on the argument that
follows.
Let xt(θ) denote the score allocation for θ in [θL, θt,1] and xt,i be the uniform score
allocation for types in (θt,i, θt,i+1], i = 1, ..., n. As before, the score allocations are de-
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termined by the integral form envelope theorem given signal allocations (as in (20) and
(21)). The teacher’s maximization problem can be expressed by the Lagrangian
L(ϕ̂t(θ), {θ̂t,i}ni=1, λ(θ)) =
∫ θ̂t,1
θL
xt(θ)f(θ)dθ + λ(θ)(θt,1 − ϕ̂t(θ)) +(61)
+
n∑
i=1
xt,i(F (θ̂t,i)− F (θ̂t,i+1)) +
n∑
i=1
µi(θ̂t,i+1 − θ̂t,i),
which has to be maximized with respect to the starting points of pooling intervals,
{θ̂t,i}ni=1, signal allocations ϕ̂t(θ) for θ ≤ θ̂t,1. As before, λ(θ) is the Lagrange multi-
plier on the constraint θt,1 ≥ ϕ̂t(θ) for θ ≤ θ̂t,1; µi is the Lagrange multiplier on the
constraint θt,i+1 ≤ θt,i, i = 1, ..., n (i.e., pooling intervals must not overlap).
Because ϕt(.) is consistent, {θt,i}ni=1 and ϕ̂t(θ) need to satisfy the first-order conditions,
which with respect to θ̂t,1 and ϕ̂t(θ) are, respectively,
θt,1 − θt,1
f(θt,1)
n∑
i=1
F (θt,i+1)− F (θt,i)
C ′(xt,i)
= xt,1 − xt(θt,1),(62)
θf(θ)
C ′ (xt(θ))
−
∫ θt,1
θ
f(θ˜)
C ′
(
xt(θ˜)
)dθ˜ − n∑
i=1
F (θt,i+1)− F (θt,i)
C ′(xt,i)
= λ(θ).(63)
The summation term appears in these conditions because θ̂t,1 and ϕ̂t(θ) enter the expres-
sions for the optimal score allocations for all θ ≥ θt,1. As θt,1 < θt,2 by construction, it
must be that µ1 = 0. Based on the same convexity argument applied for the case of t = 2
when deriving (24), we can show that
(64) xt,1 − xt(θt,1) <
θt,1
(
θt,1 − θt,1
)
C ′ (xt(θt,1))
.
Then, the summation term in (62) is strictly smaller than θt,1f(θt,1)/C
′(xt(θt,1)), which
implies that the left-hand side of (63) is strictly positive for some θ < θt,1. As a result,
the teacher cannot find it optimal to screen all the types in [θL, θt,1], which contradicts
that the grading standard ϕt(.) is consistent.
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To prove Part (ii), consider the first-order condition with respect to θt,n, the starting
point of the pooling-at-the-top interval,
(65)
θt,n − θt,n
f(θt,n)
1− F (θt,n)
C ′(xt,n)
= xt,n − xt,n−1.
We have that the difference
(66) xt,n − xt,n−1 <
θt,n
(
θt,n − θt,n
)
C ′ (xt,n)
,
which from (65) implies (1− F (θt,n))/(f(θt,n)θt,n) < 1. Thus, θt,n < θ∗1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that the score schedule in (39) with γ(θ) = θ is convex over some non-empty
interval [θ, θH ]. Let {γ∗(θ)} solve (41) and {x∗(θ)} be the optimal score schedule. Suppose
that {x∗(θ)} pools an interval [θ′, θH ], θ′ ∈ [θ, θH), for the score x∗ equal to
(67) x∗ = C−1
(
θ′θ −
∫ θ′
θL
γ∗(θ˜)dθ˜ − θ2L
)
,
where θ =
∫ θH
θ′ θdF (θ)/(1 − F (θ′)). Now consider the following signal schedule {γ̂(θ)}:
γ̂(θ) = γ∗(θ) for θ < θ′ and γ̂(θ) = θ for θ in [θ′, θH ]. Denote the score schedule defined
by (39) with {γ̂(θ)} by {x̂(θ)}.
Noting that x̂(θ) = x∗(θ) for θ < θ′ the difference in the teacher’s expected utility
levels from implementing {x̂(θ)} and {x∗(θ)} is equal to
(68)
∫ θH
θ′
x̂(θ)dF (θ)− x∗(1− F (θ′)).
By the hypothesis the score schedule {x̂(θ)} is convex over [θ′, θH ], thus, by the Jensen’s
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inequality we have∫ θH
θ′
x̂(θ)dF (θ) =
∫ θH
θ′
C−1
(
θγ̂(θ)−
∫ θ
θL
γ̂(θ˜)dθ˜ − θ2L
)
dF (θ)(69)
≥ C−1
(
θγ̂(θ)−
∫ θ
θL
γ̂(θ˜)dθ˜ − θ2L
)
(1− F (θ′))(70)
= C−1
(
θγ̂(θ)−
∫ θ′
θL
γ∗(θ˜)dθ˜ −
∫ θ
θ′
γ̂(θ˜)dθ˜ − θ2L
)
(1− F (θ′))(71)
> C−1
(
θγ̂(θ)−
∫ θ′
θL
γ∗(θ˜)dθ˜ − γ̂(θ)(θ − θ′)− θ2L
)
(1− F (θ′))(72)
= C−1
(
θ′γ̂(θ)−
∫ θ′
θL
γ∗(θ˜)dθ˜ − θ2L
)
(1− F (θ′))(73)
= x∗(1− F (θ′)),(74)
where the last inequality follows from γ̂(.) and C−1(.) being increasing. Thus, the differ-
ence in (68) is positive, which implies that pooling at the top cannot be optimal if the
score schedule under separation is convex.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let {γ∗(θ)} solve (41) and {x∗(θ)} be the optimal score schedule. Suppose that {x∗(θ)}
contains pooling intervals and denote the right-most pooling interval by [θ1, θ2]. By
Proposition 2 it must be that θ2 < θH . Now consider the following signal schedule
{γ̂(θ)}: γ̂(θ) = γ∗(θ) for θ < θ1 and γ̂(θ) = θ for θ in [θ1, θH ]. Denote the score schedule
defined by (39) with {γ̂(θ)} by {x̂(θ)}.
The difference in the teacher’s expected utility levels from implementing the score
schedules {x̂(θ)} and {x∗(θ)} is equal to
(75)
∫ θ2
θ1
(x̂(θ)− x∗(θ)) dF (θ) +
∫ θH
θ2
(x̂(θ)− x∗(θ)) dF (θ).
The first term of the difference in (75) is positive, which follows from the Jensen’s inequal-
ity applied to the score schedule {x̂(θ)}, which is convex over [θ1, θ2]. For θ ∈ (θ2, θH ],
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the score allocations x̂(θ) and x∗(θ) are, respectively, given by
x̂(θ) = C−1
(
θγ̂(θ)−
∫ θ
θL
γ̂(θ˜)dθ˜ − θ2L
)
(76)
= C−1
(
θγ̂(θ)−
∫ θ1
θL
γ∗(θ˜)dθ˜ −
∫ θ2
θ1
γ̂(θ˜)dθ˜ −
∫ θ
θ2
γ̂(θ˜)dθ˜ − θ2L
)
(77)
and
(78) x∗(θ) = C−1
(
θγ∗(θ)−
∫ θ1
θL
γ∗(θ˜)dθ˜ −
∫ θ2
θ1
γ∗(θ˜)dθ˜ −
∫ θ
θ2
γ∗(θ˜)dθ˜ − θ2L
)
.
Since γ̂(θ) = γ∗(θ) for θ ∈ [θL, θ1) ∪ (θ2, θH ], we get that x̂(θ) ≥ x∗(θ) if and only if
(79)
∫ θ2
θ1
γ̂(θ˜)dθ˜ ≤
∫ θ2
θ1
γ∗(θ˜)dθ˜.
As γ∗(θ) = E(θ ∈ [θ1, θ2]) =
∫ θ2
θ1
θdF (θ)/(F (θ2) − F (θ1)) for θ in [θ1, θ2], the latter
condition becomes
(80)
∫ θ2
θ1
θdθ
θ2 − θ1 ≤
∫ θ2
θ1
θdF (θ)
F (θ2)− F (θ1) ,
which is (44) in the proposition. Thus, when (44) holds together with convexity condition
(43), the difference in (75) is positive. This implies that the optimal score schedule {x∗(θ)}
cannot pool the types in [θ1, θ2] nor, analogously, in any other interval.
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Figure 1: Optimal grading rules
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Figure 2: Dynamics of grading rules with f(θ) = 1
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Figure 3: Dynamics of grading rules with f(θ) = θ
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